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1. Introduction 
Mergers and takeovers are one of the most researched areas in finance as exemplified by the 
book by Weston et al. (1990). However most studies concentrate on US markets and, more 
recently, on UK markets, see for instance Higson and Elliott (1993). Yet there is still little 
additional evidence coming from small or emerging markets to complement the results 
already established for bigger markets. This paper aims to extend those classical research 
lines to an small (about 1% out of the total world market in 1993) market but one that is 
reaching significant magnitudes relative to most of the European stock markets. 
This is, in our best knowledge, the first study of takeovers in Spain based on the Spanish 
stock market data. Before the Stock Market Act (1989) there were no recorded takeovers 
because of lack of legal regulation on these matters. After the Stock Market Law an 
increasing number of takeovers has been registered l • However the number of operations is 
not comparable with the major markets and therefore, our sample is relatively small and 
therefore, the results should be viewed as tentative. However, some interesting suggestions 
emerge from the analysis. 
Two particular aspects of takeover activity are analyzed in this paper. First, we find 
abnormal positive returns for the target firms. Second, we find evidence suggesting 
significant insider trading before formal announcements. In comparison with the well-known 
I From 1990 to 1993 the number of registered takeovers was 103. On average, the total 
amount of resources involved is about 2% of total market value each year. The peak was 
reached in 1991 when the resources involved amounted to more than 4% of the total market 
vajue of that year. 
2 
results for the US market by Keown and Pinkerton (1981), abnormal returns in the spanish 
market for the targets seem to be bigger. Also the extent of insider trading may be more 
significant than in other markets. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the data and section 3 the 
methodology. The empirical results are presented in section 4, where we also include a 
comment on Spanish Regulation on Inside Trading. In section 5 we address some concluding 
comments. 
2. Data 
A total of 103 successful takeovers (OPA) were recorded in the Madrid Stock Market (MSM) 
during the period 1990 to 1993. The sample includes takeovers of industrial, commercial and 
financial companies2• About 93 % of the takeovers were friendly (Le. the first bid was not 
rejected by the target management). There are 110 bidders3 (many bidders are foreign 
companies whose shares are not traded in Spain) and 103 targets. From that sample, we 
selected the firms which meet the following requirements: 
2 It is interesting to note that, in our sample, typically the bidder's market value was 
about 200 % the market value of the average firm in the Indice General de la Bolsa de Madrid 
(IGBM). This is a value-weighted index that is made up by the 72 main firms listed in the 
MSM and is used in this study as a "market factor". The target's value was about 50% of 
the average firm in the IGBM. This result suggesting that acquired firms are smaller is in 
agreement with many published studies, see Morck et al. (1987). 
3 The number of bidders is greater than the number of targets because in some cases 
there is a joint offer from a group of companies. For instance when CAMPSA was the 
target, the OPA was jointly managed by five different firms: PETRONOR, REPSOL, 
CEPSA, ERTOIL and PETROMED. 
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(i) The stock is continuously listed on the MSM for 244 days before the takeover's 
announcement date, and 60 days after, at least. 
(ii) The announcement and the outcome date must be officially registered by the Comision 
Nacional del Mercado de Valores (CNMV), which is the Spanish version of the US's SEC-. 
(iii) Events which involve the transformation of a public corporation into a privately-held 
firm (Going Private) are excluded from the sample. 
After applying those criteria, our final sample consists of 59 targets and 27 bidders. 
Therefore the degree of statistical confidence one could assume analyzing bidders is 
somewhat limited, and therefore we concentrate in the analysis of targets. 
3. Metbodolof:)' 
In order to analyze the data we adopt the standard approach, developed by Fama et al. 
(1969), and Brown and Warner (1980, 1985). Event studies in finance measure stock 
performance after subtracting a benchmark return based on beta risk. We compute abnormal 
returns over three periods: a) the pre-announcement period, including 244 days pre-
announcement to the day before official announcement (when the target's stock trade is 
4 The takeover procedure is as follows. The bid must be presented in the CNMV which 
sets the announcement date and automatically stops the target's stock trade. If the bid is 
accepted by all parts (CNMV, bidder and target) target's stock trade is resumed and an 
outcome date is fixed. The outcome date is the date on which the offer becomes 
unconditional. 
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suspended), b) the announcement period, from the day when target's stock trade is resumed 
(day 0) to the day in which the bid goes unconditional, and c) the post-takeover period. 
Periods b) and c) must cover at least 3 months (60 trading days). The reason is that the 
duration of the announcement period varies across takeovers, but in most cases (almost 90 %) 
the outcome date is one to three months after the bid announcement. 
For each of the sample securities daily rates of return were calculated as: 
(1) 
where Pjt is the closing price for security j on day t and Djt is the cash dividend on day t. 
Abnormal returns were estimated by means of the market model: 
(2) 
where Ra. is the return on IGBM stock index and aj' Pj are parameters to be estimated and 
Ejt are random innovations. The estimated abnormal return is given by the following equation 
(3) 
where hats above parameters and innovations denote estimators of the corresponding 
variables. Three methods were used to estimate these parameters. First, ordinary least 
squares (OLS). Second the method by Cohen et al. (1983) (CHMSW) with a maximum of 
five days in price adjustments, which generalizes Scholes and Williams (1977), to take into 
account frictions in the trading process (nonsynchronous trading, etc.). Third, the Market 
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Adjusted Return method (MAR) which can be thought as a particular case of OLS, where 
aj=O, Pj =1 for all firms. Since aj' for daily data, is small and the average Pj over all firms 
is 1, this approximation usually produces acceptable results. 
To eliminate possible event-driven bias in the estimates of a;, Pi the parameters were 
estimated using the three methods (OLS, CHMSW, MAR) over the first 224 trading days of 
the study, thus excluding the 25 trading days prior to the announcement dareS. Then, for 
these 25 days and for periods b) and c) (usually 90 data points in total), we computed 
average abnormal returns (AAR) over all stocks in day t as follows: 
1 N .. 
MRt =-Leit (4) Ni-1 
where N is the number of securities in the sample with a return in t. The cumulative average 
abnormal return (CAAR) from event day t. to ~ is: 
(5) 
If there are no unusual price movements prior to the announcement date, one would expect 
both AAR and CAAR to fluctuate randomly. It should be noted however that CAAR follows 
a random walk and can give easily the appearance of "significant" positive or negative drift 
when none is present. 
Testing for abnormal returns is performed with four different statistics, two for AAR and two 
5 A check of the stability of Pj (estimated by OLS) between the first 112 and last 112 
trading days of this 224 trading day sample indicated the Pj'S were stable over this period 
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for CAAR. For AAR we compute the standard t-ratio and T2 which is the signs test which 
counts the number of positive and negative abnormal returns and computes their significance 
using z-statistics which is approximately normally distributed with mean 0 and variance 1 
under the null hypothesis. For CAAR we compute T3 which is the ratio of the cumulative 
mean excess return to its estimated standard deviation with autocorrelation adjustments, see 
Brown and Warner (1985, pp. 29), and T4 which is the nonparametric test proposed by 
Corrado (1989) 
4. Empirical Results 
Daily AAR and CAAR for the whole sample were computed using the three methods. Test 
statistics and graphs are given in Tables6 1 to 3 and figures 1 and 2. In examining figure 1 
(standardized AAR with asymptotic confidence intervals) the first striking feature is the huge 
positive residual (about 17%) in day 0 which suggests a market reaction consistent with the 
semistrong form efficient market hypothesis. Also there is a bunch of positive abnormal 
residuals, some of them nearly significant in the 20 previous trading days before the 
announcement date. This could suggest information leakage before the announcement date. 
In the movement of the CAAR (figure 2) there appear to be a more or less random behavior 
during the first days. However around day -20 there seems to be a change and CAAR takes 
on abnormal characteristics, rising quickly. This suggests that an active market for 
information develops about impending takeovers bids. A number of identifiable influences 
6 To save space we present only the results of OLS estimation because no significant 
difference was found between this methodology and the others. The results for the MAR and 
CHMSW methods are available on request. 
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A comment on Spanish Re&uJation OD Inside Tradin& 
Regulation of inside trading based on private information has been addressed only in 
relatively recent times in Spain. The Securities Exchange Act of 1989 regulated trading by 
insiders and requires trading by corporate directors and substantial owners (above S%) to be 
reported to CNMV. Trading on the basis of nonpublic information is considered illegal and 
subject to not very stiff penalties when discovered'. The Takeover Decree of 1991 further 
regulated the trading by insiders specifically in takeovers, and the degree of severity of 
offenses to the regulation rules is similarly small. 
Since 1989 to the end of 1993, the regulatory authorities only acknowledge four registered 
(by the CNMV) cases of inside trading. Only one has been fined, two others are still under 
scrutiny by CNMV and the fourth has been supersede. 
The empirical results presented in this paper suggests that a significant leakage of takeover 
related inside information has been present, even after the regulations took place. The record 
of the regulatory authorities in prosecuting cases of inside information does not seems to be 
particularly impressive, perhaps reflecting the very difficult burden of proving that the trade 
was motivated by the trader's access to nonpublic information. On the other hand, the light 
penalties are an additional incentive to engage in these illegal activities. 
, There are no imprisonment penalties. Fines are at most five times the gross profit from 
the illegal trade or five million pesetas (about $40.000 USD) or S% of equity value (if the 
offence comes from a firm). 
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The question of what should be the most efficient institutional framework is an interesting, 
albeit not extensively researched one. For instance, Leland (1992) suggests that as the degree 
of development of financial market increases, insider trading becomes less harmful. Some 
authors, Estrada (1993), suggests that inside trading regulations may generate not only 
reallocation of wealth but also reallocation of risk in a given economy. This might have 
important effects on social welfare. 
Summing up, it seems that despite insider trading is formally prohibited, no effective 
deterring mechanism has been put forward. The policy implications to improve efficiency and 
avoid this ambiguity should be either to promote more active prosecution or deregulation. 
5. Concludin& Remarks 
The empirical evidence examined in this paper suggests that the behavior of stock prices 
during takeovers in a small market (Spain) is pretty similar to the pattern observed in the 
larger U.S. and U.K. stock markets. Specifically, we have found evidence on large positive 
abnormal returns and on the existence of insider trading. 
While these findings are relevant for the particular market considered, it is still too early to 
conclude that small stock markets share the characteristics of large ones. First, there are few 
studies of small markets. Second, merger activity during the period considered results, at 
least in part, from a particular institutional change, namely the opening of the spanish 
economy to the E.C. 's common market. And third, spanish regulation on takeovers is new 
so that merger activity may have been somehow biased during the period considered. 
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Sample 
(-60,60) 
(-40,40) 
(-20,20) 
(-10,10) 
(-5,5) 
(-60,0) 
(-40,0) 
(-20,0) 
(-10,0) 
(-5,0) 
(0,60) 
(0,40) 
(0,20) 
(0,10) 
(0,5) 
Table I Statistic T2 (Signs test) 
% Resid > 0 P val 
64 0.029 
65 0.027 
72 0.015 
74 0.013 
72 0.015 
64 0.029 
64 0.029 
66 0.025 
62 0.037 
62 0.037 
74 0.013 
72 0.015 
74 0.013 
67 0.024 
66 0.025 
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Sample 
(-60,60) 
(-40,40) 
(-20,20) 
(-10,10) 
(-5,5) 
(-60,0) 
(-40,0) 
(-20,0) 
(-10,0) 
(-5,0) 
(0,60) 
(0,40) 
(0,20) 
(0,10) 
(0,5) 
Table 11 Statistic T3 
CAAR T val 
46.32 6.48 
39.18 6.52 
22.81 5.23 
17.35 5.63 
6.11 2.74 
14.01 3.27 
12.33 4.03 
8.97 4.01 
6.16 3.75 
0.87 1.21 
32.77 20.31 
27.64 12.11 
14.41 4.68 
11.65 2.70 
5.74 2.09 
(Borg & Warner) 
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Sample RMA T val 
(-60,60) 164.85 5.72 
(-40,40) 165.78 6.01 
(-20,20) 168.46 4.91 
(-10,10) 169.24 5.11 
(-5,5) 174.89 2.21 
(-60,0) 164.84 2.74 
(-40,0) 166.18 3.11 
(-20,0) 177.30 3.08 
(-10,0) 168.42 2.96 
(-5,0) 156.69 0.87 
(0,60) 178.32 17.16 
(0,40) 170.05 8.41 
(0,20) 170.19 3.11 
(0,10) 166.49 2.21 
(0,5) 166.92 1.73 
Table III Statistic T4 (Corrado) 
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